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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies
there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no con-
stitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.
-LEARNED HAND.
CHANGES IN THE ILLINOIS LAW OF CIVIL RIGHTS
MANLY W. MUMFORD
AW AFFECTING RACIAL or religious discrimination has, in recent
years, come under the designation "civil rights" whether affect-
ing discrimination by units of government or by persons or
corporations in their business capacities. Indeed, many seem to believe
that this area of law is the only one to which the phrase applies. Purists
might argue that civil rights are those of the individual against his
government, not those against individuals, and suggest that some other
adjective than "civil" be used to describe the rights of a man to be free
of non-governmental discrimination. Yet in practice, the enactment
into law of rights against both private and governmental discrimination
is generally urged by the same people, opposed by the same people,
and dedicated to the same major purpose-the elimination of all forms
of racial and religious discrimination. Thus the phrase "civil rights"
has, in use, been broadened to include rights not strictly civil.
PROTECTION AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL DISCRIMINATION
Civil rights further include the rights which protect a citizen against
other abuses and excessive restraints on liberty by governmental agen-
cies. Classic examples are rights to free speech, religion, assembly, and
press. For the purpose of this article, two categories of civil rights are
set up, one consisting of rights against religious and racial discrimina-
tion, the other category comprising all other civil rights. In Illinois the
law existing in 1950 in the first category has changed but little in the
succeeding ten years. No law by its terns (as is the case in certain
sister states) required racial or religious discrimination then, and none
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does now. On the other hand, few restraints were placed on private or
business discrimination then, and not many more have been added. In
the second category, several laws have been enacted to protect the in-
dividual against excesses by various arms of the government; one law
does, in this author's opinion, constitute such an excess.
The most significant law in the latter field is probably chapter 38,
section 601.1 of the ILLINOIs REVISED STATUTES, which declares that in
a criminal trial in a state court, a previous trial and acquittal or convic-
tion for the same act or omission by a federal court is a sufficient de-
fense. This law was designed to prevent the double jeopardy situation
permitted under the interpretation of the United States Constitution
by the United States Supreme Court in Bartkus v. Illinois., In that case,
the defendant, after acquittal in federal court of robbing a federal sav-
ings and loan association, was tried and convicted in an Illinois court
for robbery of the same institution. The FBI agent who gathered
evidence before the federal trial turned over all that evidence, plus
some obtained after the trial, to the Illinois prosecuting officials. The
United States Supreme Court held that this second trial and subse-
quent conviction did not violate either the double jeopardy clause of
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution or the due
process clause of the fourteenth. The Illinois statute would not, and
could not, prevent a federal trial of a crime for which a man was
previously tried in Illinois, but it can and does prevent a subsequent
trial in an Illinois court for an act for which the defendant was
previously tried in a federal court.
The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act is of sufficient impor-
tance that it is mentioned in this article even though adopted a little
before the ten-year period dealt with here.2 This act permits a man
convicted of a crime to show, after conviction and sentencing, that his
conviction resulted from a trial at which the rights guaranteed him by
the United States Constitution were not observed. How the law came
to be enacted after the United States Supreme Court severely criticized
our legal system for failing to provide any such safeguard is admirably
told in a commentary by Albert E. Jenner, Jr.8
1359 U.S. 121 (1959).
2 For a discussion of The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, see Starts, The Post-
Conviction Hearing Act-1949-1960 and Beyond, 10 DE PAUL L. REv. 397 (1961).
8 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 581-end (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1960) at 313.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Chapter 38, section 580a of the ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES au-
thorizes a court on motion of the prosecuting attorney to grant im-
munity to a witness from prosecution for any crime under Illinois law
about which he may testify at a trial or grand jury investigation. Often
the witnesses who know most about a crime were closely enough con-
nected to it so that they might be prosecuted as accomplices or acces-
sories, or for some other related crime. Consequently, a witness who
chose not to tell all he knew could invoke the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination and could not be compelled to testify against
another, even though the witness himself were not on trial. The act
gives sanction to a practice which, it is said, has been used in the past-
i.e., the practice of the prosecutor promising not to go after one of a
group of people who allegedly committed a crime, in exchange for the
testimony of that individual. Further, this act clears the way so that
such a witness can, perhaps, be compelled to accept the bargain. A state's
attorney attempting to secure an order compelling such testimony from
an unwilling witness, however, faces practical hindrances. The testi-
mony of such a witness might help show that he violated a federal law
(that he got income which he failed to report on his federal income tax
return, for instance) or the law of another state. Also, if a witness
refused to accept the immunity grant on the grounds that he might
incriminate himself under federal law, or the law of another state, the
prosecution might have a hard time getting an order compelling him
to show how such testimony would incriminate him. 4
Chapter 38, section 206.1 prohibits "electronic eavesdropping."
Before 1957, wiretapping as such was prohibited,5 but modern tech-
nology and the need for enforcement provisions required a more
sophisticated law. The new law prohibits, with certain minor excep-
tions, the use of any device employing electricity to hear or record an
oral conversation without the consent of any party thereto. Both civil
and criminal penalties are imposed, and evidence obtained in violation
of the act is not admissible at a trial or legislative or administrative
hearing. Now it is illegal to use "bugs" (powerful microphones con-
cealed in a room or attached to the adjoining wall of the next room)
4 The Federal Government is not so inhibited. Under the immunity section of the
Narcotic Control Act of 1956, the court can compel testimony and grant immunity
from state or federal prosecution. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1406 (Supp. 1960); Reina v. United
States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960).
5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 134, § 15a (1959).
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and induction coils (which can pick up a conversation on a telephone
by merely being near the wire without physical contact)."
Chapter 38, section 449.1, imposes a fine of from $100 to $1,000 or a
sentence of ten days to six months in jail on anyone convicted of deny-
ing a prisoner the right to consult with counsel or holding a prisoner
over twenty-four hours without letting him notify his family that he is
being held. This is a step in the right direction toward adding meaning
to the right a man has to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, or to get
legal advice before lengthy imprisonment and extensive questioning
by the police. A difficulty of this law is that by setting a criminal
penalty for the proscribed behavior, it makes enforcement rely on the
willingness of a state's attorney to prosecute a policeman, maybe even
one of his own men. As the state's attorney may in the future rely on
the same policeman to get the evidence necessary to successful prose-
cution of another case, he might find such interest in conflict with his
duty to enforce this particular law.
Chapter 38, section 736.2, provides' that in a criminal trial the court
may not require, request, or suggest a lie detector test or the taking of
sodium pentathol (truth serum) by a person charged with crime. To
make any such requirement at a criminal trial would be reversible
error,7 but previously, certain judges would occasionally suggest the
lie detector test or truth serum. This law recognizes the fact of life
that a judge whose suggestion for a lie detector test is rejected by a
defendant might form an opinion as to that defendant's guilt before all
evidence and arguments were complete.
Chapter 51, section 57, provides that no witness can be compelled in
a trial or administrative hearing or other tribunal to testify before
radio or television or moving picture cameras. This, of course, was an
attempt to prevent some of the abuses which had, during the hearings
of Senator McCarthy's subcommittee of the United States Senate
Committee on Government Operations, subjected many people to ac-
cusations in the form of questions over national radio and television
networks without opportunity to show the accusations untrue.
6 For an excellent collection of material on the techniques of modem electronic
eavesdropping and arguments for and against their use, see the appendix to Hearings
on Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, and the Bill of Rights Before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959).
7 People v. Sims, 395 111. 69, 69 N.E.2d 336 (1946). See also Henderson v. State, 94
Okla. Grim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951); Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952).
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Another attempt to prevent other abuses of the legislative com-
mittee inquiry was chapter 63, sections 13.1-.5. This law grants to any
witness before any legislative or administrative investigation the right
to counsel and certain other rights to protect his reputation against
public accusations.
These original, rare, and welcome restraints of the General Assem-
bly upon its own behavior are, in this author's opinion, worthy of con-
siderable praise. So are the other laws abovementioned, as they exhibit
a continuing attempt by our state government to increase the civil free-
dom of our people. One black mark is chapter 127, section 166b. One
of the Broyles Bills, of which a number were introduced in the 1951,
1953, and 1955 sessions of the General Assembly, this law requires all
public employees to subscribe to oaths stating that they are not knowing
members of any organization which advocates overthrow of the gov-
ernment by illegal means.8 Considering the temper of the times when
it was enacted, we are probably lucky that nothing worse became law.
There would be no objection if every public employee were required
to take an oath to support and defend the Constitutions of the State of
Illinois and of the United States, but this law, by striking at mere
membership in an organization regardless of the loyalty of the indi-
vidual to the State and the United States, violates the common legal
precept that a transgressor is determined to be such on the basis of his
own actions, not those of one of the organizations to which he may
belong. A very loyal American might join a communist front organi-
zation with the intention of lessening its effectiveness or "subverting"
it to the principles of democracy.
RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION-THE NEED
FOR LEGISLATION
Our sins in the field of civil rights, however, have mostly been those
of omission rather than commission, and largely deal with our failure
to enact measures to end racial and religious discrimination.9 Some
8 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, § 166a (1959), is another Broyles bill, and prohibits the use
of any state funds for compensation or expenses of a person advocating overthrow of
the government by illegal means or knowingly remaining a member for twenty days
or more or joining an organization which advocates overthrow of the government by
illegal means.
9 AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, THE LOST DECADE (1960), analyzes Illinois legislation
in the field of racial and religious discrimination, 1949-1959.
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legislation has been adopted, but it measures up to that enacted in
other northern industrial states in neither quality nor quantity.
The Public Accommodations Law was enacted in 1935 and has
changed little since then.'0 In 1957, it was extended to prohibit racial
and religious discrimination by public golf courses and public golf
driving ranges, and in 1959, it was made to cover crematories. Enforce-
ment of this sort of law rests on the individual discriminated against,
and is therefore very likely to be unenforced. A man can hardly be
expected to stop at the courthouse on his way to lunch to get an in-
junction so that he can be seated in the restaurant.
Hospitals can lose their tax exemption under a 1959 law for dis-
criminating on admission because of race, color or creed," and a con-
cessionaire in a state park can lose his lease for the same reason.12
What laws there are in Illinois against discrimination in employ-
ment apply only to state agencies or subdivisions. A few statutes have
been enacted in this area during the last ten years. Chapter 242, sec-
tion 38b.5 prohibits the asking on a university civil service system
examination of any question relating to political or religious affiliation
or racial origins of the examinee. Local school districts are denied state
aid by chapter 122, section 18-14 if they discriminate in the hiring of
teachers on account of color, creed, race, or nationality. Possibly this
legislation is superfluous in a way, because discrimination by state
agencies on such grounds is in violation of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution.
A 1953 amendment 13 to the Neighborhood Redevelopment Corpo-
ration Act'4 requires a redevelopment corporation to agree in writing
that in selling, leasing, and managing all real property subject to the
plan under which the corporation operates, there will be no dis-
crimination against any person on account of his race, color, creed, or
national origin. Section 10 of the act 5 requires that shares in the
corporation be available to all regardless of race, color, creed, or na-
tional origin. Section 10 (10) 10 prohibits the corporation from acquir-
10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 125-128g (1959).
11 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 500.7 (1959).
12 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, § 468.1 (1959).
13 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 267(2) (d) (1959)
14 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 671, S§ 251-94 (1959).
15 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 67 , S 260(10) (1959).
16 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 671, S 260(12) (1959).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ing tide to property solely because of the race, color, creed, or national
origin of the owner.
Illinois is the only northern industrial state without a law prohibit-
ing racial or religious discrimination in employment. Most northern
industrial states have Fair Employment Practices Commission laws.
Such legislation has been submitted to the General Assembly for the
last several sessions, but so far has failed to pass.
The typical FEPC law prohibits racial or religious grounds as reasons
for hiring or firing employees in firms of larger than a specified
small size. To enforce the law, a commission is created with the power
to hear complaints of people who claim that illegal discrimination was
applied to them. The commission is empowered to subpoena witnesses
and hold hearings to determine whether in fact any such discrimina-
tion did occur. On a finding of illegal discrimination, the commission
can enter an order directing the offending employer to cease and desist
from it. Such an order can be appealed to the courts, or the commis-
sion can apply to the court for enforcement of the order if, absent a
court decree reversing it, the order of the commission is not complied
with.
In conclusion, it seems to this writer that Illinois has done well in
enacting laws to promote the civil rights of its citizens-with one large
exception in the very field where the most needed to be done. The law
prohibiting state court criminal trials for the same act for which a man
was tried in federal court, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the laws
prohibiting electronic eavesdropping, holding prisoners incommuni-
cado, suggestion by judges that suspects take lie detector tests, and com-
pulsory testimony before radio, television, or moving picture cameras,
and the law granting rights to witnesses before a legislative or adminis-
trative hearing, all are to our credit. The grant of immunity to wit-
nesses does no serious harm to our civil rights, and the law requiring
non-communist oaths of public employees, though unnecessary and
impertinent, can be lived with. But we have not done so well as we
should have in the area of racial and religious discrimination. Much has
been said about the damage the existing discrimination does to our for-
eign relations; some has been said about its wastefulness in economic
and human resources. More should be said, though, to remind us that
an unjustly discriminatory society is not a society we believe in, and
that the standards we require our state to live up to should, in this area,
be higher than they are.
